A Brief History of the U.S. Army National Guard
By Andrew Wiest, Ph.D.
The United States military system was a product of its British colonial forbearers, and in Britain the trained, full-time soldiers of the regular army were often mistrusted and held in uniquely low esteem. At least since the dawning of the Tudor era, all too often the fighting and dying in English wars fell to the dregs of society. Relying on impressment to force the unlucky to fight, the English Army preyed on the lowest and most vulnerable especially in terms of overseas military service. Even in the famed Elizabethan military, English military critic Barnaby Rich observed, “In England, when service happens, we disburden the prisons of thieves, we rob the taverns and alehouses of tosspots and ruffians, we scour both town and country of rogues and vagabonds.” The situation indeed got so bad that in the 1560s the English Army impressed the entire population of Newgate Prison, which was reserved for only the most hardened of criminals, while in 1597 when the army needed new recruits it simply rounded up 700 vagrants from the streets of Piccadilly in London and sent them to war.[1]
While the great unwashed masses were fine as cannon fodder in wars abroad, home defense in England was quite another matter. Toward this end, the government of Queen Elizabeth I developed the idea of forming the more stalwart local citizens of England into “trainbands” tasked with local defense and with keeping public order. These trainbands were made up of armed, loyal local citizens and were officered by dependable men of the upper classes of local society. Thus, England developed a two-tiered military. Regular forces impressed from the lowest ranks of society mainly for use in overseas campaigns since they could not be trusted at home, and the trainbands that consisted of stout, dependable sons of England for home service.
The tradition of armed, upstanding local citizenry forming the true centerpiece of England’s power found fertile soil in the newfound American colonies. By 1631 Massachusetts had set up the first American trainbands, then known as militia, with armed local males in each town setting up defense forces that consisted of every male between the ages of 16 to 50. By 1672 the situation had become less chaotic with local militias answering to a Sergeant Major General for the Massachusetts Colony. Town militia companies were established at a strength of 64 men who answered to a locally-chosen captain who was assisted by a lieutenant. The men were directed to drill and be inspected six days out of every year, with military duty falling to all able-bodied men, at the risk of a five shilling fine. If militiamen were habitually absent, they could be sentenced to the stock, “riding the wooden horse,” or even prison.[2]
The militia system of Massachusetts flourished and became the centerpiece of the new American way of making war across the length and breadth of the colonies. The military system tied communities and the military together with unbreakable bonds of kinship and camaraderie, with Parker’s unit at Lexington standing as a sterling example since the nearly eighty men in the company included eight pairs of fathers and sons, and nearly one quarter of the men were Parker’s own blood relatives or in-laws. The “army as community” was initially looked down on by many of the British regular officers who fought alongside and often commanded colonial militia units in Britain’s many colonial wars in the New World, but the martial capacity of these local citizen soldiers soon became clear, with one British commander remarking, “Whoever looks upon them as an irregular mob, will find himself very much mistaken. They have men amongst them who know very well what they are about.”[3] However, there were downsides to having the local young men of every town gather on occasion to train. During King Phillip’s War, one of Massachusetts’ leading colonial generals complained that the men of many militias engaged in “the shameful and scandalous sin of excessive drinking, tippling, and company keeping in taverns,” and later fumed that some of the men were in “loose and sinfull costume and going riding from toune to toune and that often times men and women were together. . . to merely drink and revell in ordinarys and taverns, which itself is scandalous, and . . . a notable means to debauch our youth and hazard chastity.”[4]
It was the healthy suspicion of Britain’s Regular Army, coupled with rising taxes, and British moves to lessen colonial autonomy that led to the American Revolution. The first battles of that revolution were militia affairs, including the famous stand at Bunker Hill. Only in 1775 did the Second Continental Congress act to create the Continental Army, the first standing Regular Army in the nascent country. To construct his new army, General George Washington was escorted by a mounted militia unit – the First Troop, Philadelphia City Cavalry. This first ever unit of Washington’s army still exists today as Troop A, 104th Cavalry of the Pennsylvania National Guard.[5] For the entire American Revolution the Continental Army, much of which was composed of ex militia members, fought alongside militia units in campaigns up and down the Atlantic seaboard.
“The militia system of Massachusetts flourished and became the centerpiece of the new American way of making war across the length and breadth of the colonies. The military system tied communities and the military together with unbreakable bonds of kinship and camaraderie.”
Forming an American Way of War
After independence, the United States retained a healthy skepticism of the threat posed to democracy by a Regular Army. As would become American military tradition, in 1783, only six months after the Peace of Paris, all troops of the Continental Army were discharged, and by the next year the Regular Army consisted of 80 Revolutionary War veterans who guarded the military stores at West Point and Fort Pitt.[6] American reliance on the “citizen soldier” had begun. Instead of a national army, the United States chose to depend on an armed citizenry organized into local militia units that could be federalized and brought together to form a true national army only in time of great need. Once the need for a national army had passed, control of the soldiers would return to the states and localities that they served. It was Thomas Jefferson who put America’s peculiar reliance on citizen soldiers over regular soldiers into words stating that the militia formed “one of the essential principals of our government” and supported “the supremacy of the civil over the military authority,” reasoning that “a well-regulated militia [stands as] our best reliance in peace and for the first months of war, till Regulars may relieve them.”[7] America’s citizen soldier concept and reliance on the militia was codified in the Militia Act of 1792, which maintained the militia as the chief source of martial manpower for the new country.
In America’s ensuing conflicts, criticism of militia ineptitude in battle often ran in tandem with calls at the national level for a stronger Regular Army. As a result, in conflicts as diverse as the Whiskey Rebellion, through the War of 1812, and even the American Civil War the militia was sometimes questioned in its ability, leading to larger iterations of a Regular Army. But in each of these conflicts it was militiamen that formed the leading edge of America’s armed force whether it be incursions into Canada in 1812, or the pivotal Battle of Buena Vista in the Mexican-American War where 90% of the soldiers engaged on the US side were volunteers, or the Battle of Bull Run in 1861. Whether performing well, or sometimes haphazardly, these conflicts opened as militia struggles, until the Regular Army found its way. And after the wars’ cessations, the Regular Army once again evaporated in favor of the continued reliance on militias. And in the wake of the Civil War the reliance on militias only grew. There were grave concerns over the Regular Army’s role in policing the South during Reconstruction. If the Army could be utilized to rule and reshape the South, what was to stop it in the future perhaps extending its rule on the home front? To many it all brought back unhappy historical memories of the British Army being used as a tool of tyranny over the colonies. As a result, Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibiting the Regular Army from a civil role unless so ordered by the president in time of great need. Thus, aspects of civil order, from storm relief, to calming political disturbances, to storm relief would fall to the local militias.
The Spanish-American War saw the emergence of the United States into the troubled waters of world affairs. The militia once again performed admirably, and, of the 194 militia units that served in the conflict the much-ballyhooed heroes of the war quickly became Teddy Roosevelt and his “Rough Riders,” which included New Mexico and Arizona militiamen. There were, however, also massive problems of supply, enlistment issues, training problems, and tactical gaffes that demonstrated that the American militia system of citizen soldiers needed a marked upgrade as global events threatened to draw America into further wars. Following a campaign to reform the militia led in part by Elihu Root, in 1903 Congress passed the Militia Act (often known as the Dick Act after its chief congressional champion) that converted the hodgepodge of trained and semi-trained state and local militias into the National Guard. Guard units remained under the command of their state’s governors, but the Guard was also proclaimed the chief reserve force of the Regular Army, and America’s first national line of defense in the advent of war. Called to national service by the president, the Guard was meant to check the advance of any enemy force until a Regular Army could be raised, equipped, trained, and deployed. The Dick Act required Guardsmen to attend twenty-four drill periods a year supplemented by five days of summer camp, all overseen by Regular Army trainers.[8]
The National Guard & War
The true test of the Dick Act was quick in coming, with the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The government of President Woodrow Wilson was able to avoid becoming enmeshed in the conflict until 1917, giving it nearly three years to prepare for what many considered to be an inevitability. Even with that time, though, America’s reliance on its National Guard was clear. In 1917 as American entry into the conflict loomed in part due to the submarine war in the Atlantic, the Regular Army numbered only 133,000 men while President Wilson called over 400,000 Guardsmen to national service.[9] Controversy quickly ensued as many Guard units were broken up and pieced out to form parts of new Regular Army units. Guard units also had their unit numbers and heraldry stripped as they were cannibalized. And Guard officers were often relieved of duty in favor of Regular Army officers. Eventually of the 43 American divisions sent to France 18 of them, nearly 40 percent of the entire American force, were National Guard. And Guard units suffered a total of 103,721 killed and wounded, nearly 43 percent of America’s total casualty numbers. By the end of the conflict even the notoriously hard-headed and demanding General John Pershing understood the value of the Guard, and its shabby treatment. He stated, “The National Guard never received the wholehearted support of the Regular Army during the World War. There was always more or less a prejudice against them.”[10]
After World War I the Regular Army was again dismantled in a controversial process of demobilization. Amidst the economic turmoil of the 1920s and 1930s, the Regular Army languished in size, usually hovering just under 200,000 men. It once again fell to the Guard to augment America’s dwindling military might. Toward that end the National Defense Act of 1920 authorized 435,800 Guardsmen, but congressional funding consistently fell short of supporting that number. In a resultant effort to enhance Guard recruiting, states all over the nation decided to place Guard armories, used for training and for storage of equipment, in as many communities as possible. The ensuing armory building boom brought the presence of the Guard to hundreds of new communities large and small across the country. As America lurched toward depression even as war clouds began to gather again, the new National Guard armories became erstwhile community centers, providing havens of certainty in an increasingly uncertain world. Many provided meals to the needy, others provided entertainment, ranging from concerts to parades, and all were comfortable gathering places where Guardsmen and civilians alike could seek camaraderie and solace amidst instability. The Guard building boom was transformative. The militia had always been part of the fabric of America, but it had now become intertwined with the nation at a much deeper level than ever before. Entire towns turned to the Guard for rescue and remain Guard havens to this day.
In the Second World. War the Guard did what it had always done, with its service admirably summed up by Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson:
The National Guard took to the field 18 infantry divisions, 300,000 men. Those State troops doubled the strength of the Army at once, and their presence in the field gave the country a sense that it had passed the lowest ebb of its weakness...Nine of those divisions crossed the Atlantic to Europe and Africa and nine went to the far reaches of the Pacific. The soldiers of the Guard fought in every action in which the Army participated from Bataan to Okinawa. They made a brilliant record on every fighting front. They proved once more the value of the trained citizen-soldier.[11]
While the Guard’s service in World War II was heralded, and its place in the community was secure, a yawning gulf grew between the Guard and the Regular Army. In the new world of the Cold War, America could no longer afford to completely dismantle its Regular Army’s strength after 1945. In its new role as the world’s policeman, ready to militarily counter the Soviets at a moment’s notice, the Regular Army now had to remain in permanent readiness. The Guard was still there, standing as America’s military reserve, but the Guard took an ever-receding second place to the Regular Army.
The conflicts of the Cold War era were carefully managed, lest they spiral into a catastrophic nuclear world war. And full mobilization of the Guard could have been interpreted as a provocative escalation by the Soviet Union. In Korea only select Guard units were mobilized either to take part in the war or to replenish American strength in Europe. A complex reorganization of the Guard in 1952 resulted in a renaissance of Guard training but was followed with the decision to not call the Guard to service in the Vietnam War.[12] Instead, the Guard was perceived to be a place where those with connections could avoid exposure to combat. After Vietnam, the Guard retained its connection to community, and maintained its reputation on the home front in everything from storm rescues to efforts in support of school integration. However, in a military sense the reputation of the Guard sank to its lowest level with many within the Regular Army seeing the Guard as “weekend warriors” who did the bare minimum of training and a penchant for being overweight and enjoying beer and barbeque over any real military endeavor.
A Radical Change
Even as the Guard’s public military reputation ebbed, a radical change in how America would its wars took place. After the failure in Vietnam, everything was on the table as the military rethought how it would approach future wars. From recruitment, to training, to education, to a reliance on technology and maneuver, the American way of making war was restructured during the 1970s and 1980s. And one of the bedrock changes was the disappearance of the draft. Public support of the selective service process had cratered after 1968, and the draft itself was gone by 1973, and most in the military realized that it was likely never to return. Without the prospect of a draft to fill the ranks in case of war, the role of the Guard was perhaps more important than ever. Barring a conflict on par with one of the world wars bringing a forced return to the draft, the Regular Army and the National Guard, fleshed out by the Reserve, would have to suffice in wars both large and small.
Many within the military who were tasked with assessing Vietnam concluded that not calling up the National Guard had been one of the most glaring mistakes of the war. America’s resolve had failed in Vietnam, they argued, in large part due to a public disconnection with the conflict. These planners pointed to the National Guard – its myriad local connections, its armories as community focal points, its soldiers as citizens – as the most important aspect of connecting the military to the people. And not calling up the National Guard in Vietnam had severed that critical connection. Such a severance could not be allowed in future conflicts if the United States hoped to emerge victorious.
Facing a military world without a draft and needing to maintain the military’s connection to the people, planners developed the Total Force Policy. Although the tactical elements of implementing the policy have altered since its inception, the fundamental goals of the policy remain in place as a part of American war planning to this day. In essence the Regular Army and the National Guard were to be merged. The Guard, while it retained its home front duties of disaster relief, community connection, and as a break against civil disturbance, was slated to train to a constant state of readiness that put it on par with the Regular Army. In addition, Guard units were affiliated with, trained alongside, and tasked with “rounding out” Regular Army units in time of war. Initially this meant that a Regular Army division would contain only two brigades, but it would train and work with a “round out” National Guard brigade. In the event of war, the Regular Army brigades and the National Guard round out brigade would join together to deploy overseas.
The shift to the Total Force Policy was a fundamental rewrite in how America approached conflict. The militia that had defined America at war was gone. That being said, the new Guard did retain much of its local connection. Its armories remained the focus of life in small communities across the country. Those same communities sent their sons and now daughters to serve in their local unit, in something that resembled a British “Pals Battalion” in World War I. The tradition of Lexington continued. Brothers, cousins, friends, local football heroes – all who had grown up together, played sports together, gone to church together – formed the local Guard unit. These units retained their role in disaster relief and in community service. However, these units were also now a much more integral part of the American warfighting machine. How this process was to be negotiated; how the Guard was to be much more kinetic in nature, facing potentially constant wartime deployment, yet was to retain its local character, is where our story begins.
“The shift to the Total Force Policy was a fundamental rewrite in how America approached conflict. The militia that had defined America at war was gone. That being said, the new Guard did retain much of its local connection…However, these units were also now a much more integral part of the American warfighting machine. How this process was to be negotiated; how the Guard was to be much more kinetic in nature, facing potentially constant wartime deployment, yet was to retain its local character, is where our story begins.”
[1] Kyle Zelner, A Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and Militiamen during King Phillip’s War (New York: New York University Press, 2010), P. 20, 26.
[2] Zelner, Rabble in Arms, 29-31.
[3] I Am the Guard, 43.
[4] Zelner, A Rabble in Arms, 171.
[5] I Am the Guard, 51.
[6] Ibid, 70.
[7] Ibid, 78.
[8] Ibid, 117 and 128.
[9] Brian Neumann (Editor). The US. Army in the World War I Era (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 2017), P. 5.
[10] I Am the Guard, 162 and 165.
[11] Ibid, 187.
[12] The idea that no Guard soldiers served in Vietnam is not quite accurate. By the end of the war circumstances had required roughly 3,000 Guardsmen to serve in Vietnam, but the Guard was never a part of major combat operations or consideration.
Header Image: 101st Convoy preparations [Image 7 of 7], by SFC Brandon Nelson (U.S. Army) via Defense Visual Information Distribution Service.
Body Image: Reconnaissance training at Fort Indiantown Gap [Image 16 of 16], by SPC Aliyah Vivier (ARNG) via Defense Visual Information Distribution Service.
Bottom Image: British main battle tank, Challenger II [Image 2 of 2], by SFC Brandon Nelson (U.S. Army) via Defense Visual Information Distribution Service.